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state that none of them have a parent entity and that no publicly held entity
owns more than 10 percent of their stock; Plaintiffs-Appellees U.S. Security,
Global Contact Services, Inc., Infocision Management Corporation, and
Direct Marketing Association, Inc., state that none of them have a parent
entity and that no publicly held entity owns ten percent of their stock;
Plaintiff-Appellee Chartered Benefit Services, Inc., states that Chartered
Holdings, LLC, holds more than 10% of its stock.
B.
RULING UNDER REVIEW
The rulings under review are Mainstream M ktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 2003 WL
22213517 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2003); U.S. Security v. FTC, 2003 WL 22203719 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 23, 2003); and Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014 (2003).
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Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a)(1)(C), the non-governmental parties listed
above state that, other than U.S. Security v. FTC, No. 03-6276 (10th Cir. filed Oct. 17, 2003),
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are aware of no pending cases in this Court or any other court involving substantially the
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether it violates commercial telemarketers’ First Amendment rights to leave to
residential telephone subscribers only the choice of placing their telephone numbers on a
national registry, while vesting exclusively in the government the right to decide, based on
content, which calls to numbers on the registry are blocked and which are not?
2. Whether it violates commercial telemarketers’ First Amendm ent rights to
discriminate between commercial and noncommercial telemarketing solicitations where the
government has proffered no demonstrable correlation for this discriminatory treatment and
its interest in preventing unwanted calls?
3. Whether the government met its burden of demonstrating it materially advances
its interest in reducing unwanted telephone solicitations when it prohibits unwanted calls
from only a subset of commercial telemarketers, while leaving completely unaddressed the
large volume of equally unwanted calls from noncommercial telemarketers?
4. Whether the government has met its burden of demonstrating there were no
other obvious, more narrowly tailored alternatives – other than a blanket “do-not-call”
registry that substantially burdens commercial speech – when the government was presented
with an array of less restrictive alternatives that materially reduce unwanted commercial
telemarketing calls, including, among others, strengthened company-specific do-not-call
rules, which the government never bothered to enforce or publicize?
5. Whether the government may impose a fee on selected telem arketers as a
precondition for engaging in protected speech where the government will use the funds it
collects for general agency administration?
STATUTES
All pertinent statutes and regulations are attached to the government’s brief.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a cautionary tale about what happens when federal agencies allow
perceived political imperatives to override legal and constitutional concerns. Since 1992, the
FCC, later joined by the FTC, has had company-specific “do-not-call” rules requiring
telemarketers to honor individual requests to stop placing calls.

The vast majority of

telemarketers followed these rules and most consumers who used them found that they
worked to limit the number of calls received. But most people did not know of their rights
under the law, which neither agency ever enforced.

Accordingly, the FTC and FCC

concluded the old rules had failed – notwithstanding widespread public ignorance and
absence of agency enforcement – and adopted the national “do-not-call” registry (“DNCR”)
which, once a consumer registers, imposes a blanket preemptive ban on certain commercial
callers selected by the government. However, the agencies also decided, incongruously, that
company-specific rules are effective, at least for certain callers, such as commercial call
centers making calls for non-profit entities. The public, largely unaware of its rights under
the prior regulation, enthusiastically supported the new rules that are only now being widely
promoted (for the first time).
The DNCR violates basic First Amendment principles that the TCPA requires the
government to consider. It imposes excessively restrictive regulations despite the fact that
the agencies themselves found less onerous alternatives would work – most obviously
educating the public and enforcing and strengthening their other rules. The FTC and FCC
adopted the measure heedless of the widespread adverse consequences for honest
telemarketers, whose concerns were brushed aside w ithout analysis. They also riddled the
DNCR with exceptions that limit its ability to serve its purported purpose under the dubious

2

premise that some speakers have First Amendment rights that others do not. Two district
courts below correctly found that the agencies acted illegally.

3

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A.

The Telemarketing Act, TCPA, and Initial Rules

The DNCR rules under review are the product of two federal agencies acting
pursuant to two different laws, only one of which was focused on unsolicited telephone calls.
The Telemarketing Act, under which the FTC launched the initial actions leading to these
rules, says nothing about “do-not-call” mandates, but rather targets crimes perpetrated via
telemarketing. H. R EP. 103-20 at 2, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1627. It authorizes FTC “rules
prohibiting deceptive telemarketing … and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices,”
15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1), with a primary focus on illegal activities, not honest telemarketing.
Congress was concerned with “unscrupulous activities from which no one benefits but the
perpetrator” and sought “equitable balance between … stopping deceptive (including
fraudulent) and abusive telemarketing activities and not unduly burdening legitimate businesses.” 1
As a result, the FTC’s enforcement priorities through 2000 focused almost entirely on
fraud, which the agency identified as a problem distinct from unsolicited calls. In a fifth-year
review of its rules, the FTC reported to Congress “we have a lot of complaints about
telemarketing, [but] almost all of them concern allegations of fraud. Only about 1 in 10 …
concern unwanted calls.” 2
Consequently, FTC enforcement efforts were directed
exclusively toward fraud. Indeed, at a 2000 workshop, FTC Assistant Director of Marketing
Practices Eileen Harrington stated, in response to comment that the agency never enforced
the company-specific opt-out requirement, “you’re absolutely right, that our enforcement
priority has been fraud, and it will continue to be fraud until there isn’t any more fraud. That
was why this rule was issued primarily.” DNC-Tr. at 104. (P.A. 0583) The FTC considered
“do-not-call” issues to be completely separate, and of far lesser priority. 3 This changed after
the agency placed adoption of the DNCR at the top of its policy agenda.
By sharp contrast, the FCC acted pursuant to the TCPA, which “recognizes the
legitimacy of the telemarketing industry.” First TCPA Order at 8753. The TCPA directed
the FCC to ensure that any “do-not-call” regulations maintain an appropriate balance
between commercial interests and privacy concerns while meeting constitutional standards.
S. Rpt. 102-177 at 6. As originally proposed, the TCPA would have required the FCC to
implement a national “do-not-call” registry. Id. at 4-6. However, the proposed mandate was
replaced with a directive to consider alternatives and adopt balanced regulations meeting
constitutional standards. Id at 4-5. See also H. Rep. 102-317 at 19.
1

H. REP. 103-20 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1629. See also Cong. Rec. H 6160 (July 25, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Swift) (bill “does not impose further restrictions on the legitimate telemarketing
industry” but rather “target[s] strictly … telemarketing fraud, deception and other patterns of clearly
abusive telemarketing activities); id. at 6161 (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (telemarketing fraud “also
damages the legitimate honest telemarketers who rely upon telecommunications technology to
make … goods and services more readily available to the American public”).
2

Know Your Caller Act Hearing at 27 (P.A. 0676) (statement of Eileen Harrington).

3

DNC-TR. at 104-05 (P.A. 0583-84) (statement of Eileen Harrington) (“We don’t hear nearly the
level of concern from the public about [‘do-not-call’] that we do … about misrepresentation and fraud”
so “we … are concerned about real economic injury … when money is taken out of consumers’
pockets”).
4

Congress made a “public policy determination” to exclude political and other
noncommercial calls from the initial rules, in part because “the record … does not contain
sufficient evidence” regarding how welcome those calls are, and it merely “suggested” most
unwanted calls are commercial. H. Rep. 102-317 at 16. See also infra at 39-40. However,
Congress acknowledged “charitable or political calls might [in some cases] represent as
serious a problem as commercial solicitations” and added “a special requirement” that the
FCC “consider whether there was a need for additional authority [over] telephone
solicitations” from these sources. H. Rep. 102-317 at 16-17 (specifying 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(c)(1)(D)). Congress also clarified that its “reference … to [consumers] who object to
receiving certain classes or categories of telephone solicitations” in “the language
authorizing … a single national database” was “intend[ed to] be interpreted as including …
commercial, charitable and political” solicitations, and “to work hand-in-glove with the
requirement … to consider whether additional authority is needed.” Id. at 23 (citing
47 U.S.C. §§ 227(c)(3), (c)(1)(D)).
In its first TCPA rulemaking, weighing these statutory factors, the FCC declined to
adopt a national “do-not-call” registry. It did so not just because a registry would be “costly
and difficult to establish and maintain,” as the government now suggests, 4 but for other
reasons as well. A major factor was the inherent imprecision in a registry approach, which
the FCC found would not help consumers seeking “to maintain their ability to choose
among those … from whom they do and do not wish to hear.” First TCPA Order at 8761. It
also noted that consumers wishing to block every call would be disappointed, as those who
registered “would still receive calls from exempted businesses or organizations.” Id. at
8758-59.
In contrast, the FCC found company-specific “do-not-call” rules would
“represent[ ] a careful balancing of the privacy interests … against commercial speech rights
of telemarketers and the continued viability of a valuable … service.” Id. at 8766. See also id.
at 8757.
The FCC reached similar conclusions in an earlier proceeding regarding
constitutionally balancing “do-not-call” requirements. In 1980 the FCC found “all
solicitation calling – whether for charitable, political or business purposes – involves similar
privacy implications,” and noted it had “no information that [consumers] would find an
advertising message more offensive than a request for a charitable contribution or a political
message or solicitation.” FCC NOI Order, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1035. It noted in particular that
“[e]xempting calls made for political and charitable solicitation or … research purposes from
regulations” would “raise serious constitutional questions [absent] significant practical
differences between unsolicited commercial and non-commercial calls.” Id.

4

Gov’t Br. 7-8 (citing First TCPA Order at 8760-61).
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B.

DNCR Rules

The drive for a national “do-not-call” list began in October 2001 when new Chairman
Timothy J. Muris pledged to create a registry as a top FTC priority. 5 The FTC announced a
“privacy agenda” and placed creating the registry at the top of its “to do” list.
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/privacyagenda.htm. By year-end 2002, the FTC held a
press conference at which the Chairman stated, among other things, that the FTC adopted
rules fulfilling his DNCR promise. See FTC Order. Actions by Congress and the FCC
followed shortly thereafter.
Because the FTC acted before it had either specific statutory authority or funding, see
U.S. Security v. FTC, 2003 WL 22203719 *5 (W.D. Okla. 2003), it had to go to Congress,
which responded with the Implementation Act, authorizing the FTC to set fees sufficient to
implement and enforce the registry. Implementation Act § 2. It authorized the FTC to
charge telemarketers a fee to obtain the registry access needed in order to place telemarketing
calls (including to consumers not enrolled), without questioning the FTC’s claim that it
required approximately $18 million annually for the registry. The Act also established a
deadline for FCC review of its rules that commenced a couple of months before the FTC
acted, and it ordered the FCC to “consult” with the FTC to “maximize consistency” between
them.
Congress stated it did not intend to “dictate the outcome of the pending FCC
rulemaking,” or to “foreclose consideration of … factors” required by the TCPA, and it
emphasized the FCC remained bound by the TCPA balancing requirements. H. Rep. 108-8
at 9. Nevertheless, the FCC interpreted the Implementation Act as a requirement to
duplicate the FTC’s rules, and adopted essentially identical regulations. See generally FCC
Order. It consequently all but ignored its duty under the TCPA and First Amendment to
balance the impact of the new rules on legitimate telemarketing with privacy interests. W ith
respect to the impact on telemarketers, the FCC offered only a conclusory dismissal that it
was “not persuaded … a national do-not-call list will unduly interfere with the ability of
telemarketers to contact customers,” id. at 14039, echoing the one-sentence “analysis”
offered earlier by the FTC that, though the rules might eliminate 40 to 60 percent of
commercial telemarketing, it would somehow benefit the industry. FTC Order at 4631-32.
The FCC also ignored the requirement in Section 227(c)(1)(D) to collect data on whether to
extend regulation to political or charitable calls. 6
The new FTC and FCC rules prohibit selected commercial entities, and for-profit
telemarketers, from calling consumers on the national registry. Political solicitations are
never regulated, charitable solicitations conducted by call centers (but not by in-house
callers) are subject to company-specific requirements, and otherwise exempt businesses using
call centers are fully subject to the rules, including the DNCR. FTC Order at 4584-85, 4587,
4589, 4636-37. The agencies exempted certain commercial callers from using the registry,
including circumstances where a business has obtained prior express written consent from
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Remarks of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond,
The Privacy 2001 Conference, Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm.
6

FCC NPRM at 17478 (FCC “does not intend in this NPRM to seek comment on the exemption
as it applies to political and religious speech.”); see also id. at 17478-79 (same).
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the called party, and where a business has an “established business relationship” with the
called party. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(c), (f)(9)(i)-(ii).
Shortly after the FCC acted, the FTC announced fee rules applicable to both agencies’
regulations. 16 C.F.R. § 310.8; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(i)(E). The rules require payment of
fees as a precondition to making telemarketing calls. 16 C.F.R. § 310.8(a)-(b). The FTC
adopted this structure to collect from telemarketers the $18.1 million Congress authorized
for the registry’s first-year costs, an amount exceeding 10 percent of the FTC’s annual
budget. 2003 Appropriations Act at 95.
C.
Rulem aking Record
The government defends its new rules based on enforcement history and the
rulemaking record. It describes as a “major consideration” the “experience of consum ers
and enforcers of the company-specific rules” – particularly its own enforcement experience –
culminating in a finding of “great public dissatisfaction with that provision.” Gov. Br. at 12.
The government’s brief frequently refers to agency findings, but without citing any specific
facts. E.g., id. at 22 (“rulemaking records”), 28 (problems with company-specific rules), 37
(DNCR “grew out of the agencies’ enforcement experience”), 42 (DNCR “is an outgrowth
of the agencies’ experience”), 49 (“the FTC had substantial evidence that the companyspecific approach was insufficient”). The government also suggests “there were no similar
reports of dissatisfaction with respect to noncommercial telemarketing,” id. at 12, a
characterization unsupported by the record. 7
Contrary to these conclusory references, the record indicated that most people were
unaware of the “do-not-call” rules, neither the FTC nor the FCC ever enforced them, those
who made “do-not-call” requests found the rules worked, and most deficiencies the
government cited were addressed through other new rules. In addition, other less restrictive
“fixes” were overlooked. Overall, the record failed to support any claim that the volume of
calls defeated less restrictive solutions, or that commercial callers are “fundamentally
different” from noncommercial callers.
Widespread Ignorance. It is difficult to understand the government’s finding of
“great public dissatisfaction” with the company-specific rules since the record conclusively
shows the vast majority of citizens were entirely ignorant of their existence. Amicus AARP
testified about its survey “finding less than 5 percent of the people … across the country
are even aware that a do-not-call provision is in effect.” DNC-Tr. at 93. (P.A. 0577) See also
id. at 28. (P.A. 0572) NARUC testified that the vast majority of consumers in one state-wide
poll knew nothing about company-specific do-not-call options. Id. at 92. (P.A. 0576) See also
id. at 141 (NARUC testimony that “there is a general lack of awareness”); id. at 183 (P.A.
0595) (citing “general consensus” of a lack of consumer awareness); id. at 107 (P.A. 0586)
(NCL did not “know of any national surveys that have asked” about awareness “and …
7

The government cites no source for this claim. However, its own record revealed 40 percent or
more of “do-not-call” complaints relate to political and noncommercial callers. E.g., June 2002 Tr. at
206. (P.A. 0626) See also ATA Comments at 72-73. (P.A. 0123-24) The FTC’s own staff observed that
“personally, I get a lot of calls from nonprofits, and even when I ask not to get any more calls, I keep
getting them.” DNC-Tr. at 160. (P.A. 0594) Id. at 75 (P.A. 0573) (FTC staff testimony that “nonprofits
[are] the biggest problem”).
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that’s something that really needs to be done before … formulat[ing] solutions”). The FCC
record revealed the same problem. Indeed, one comment cited by the FCC to support the
registry explained that a primary reason “company specific do-not-call lists have been a
dismal failure” was “[t]he public’s ignorance of its use.” 8 Both agencies agreed greater
public awareness would help. 9 In fact, the record showed consumer education to be an
effective means of strengthening the company-specific option. See DNC-Tr. at 212. (P.A. 0604)
Lack of Enforcement The repeated references to the government’s “enforcement
experience” are curious, since no such experience exists. In the ten years that only companyspecific “do-not-call” rules were in effect, the FCC issued only one published decision (and
no forfeitures or even notices of apparent liability) that involved a violation, and in that lone
case it found only two calls that contravened a do-not-call request. See Consumer.Net v.
AT&T Corp., 15 FCC Rcd. 281, 288-89, 295-99 (1999). Similarly, internal FTC documents
reveal zero cases alleging violations of its company-specific “do-not-call” rules. 10 The FTC’s
lack of activity is explained by its exclusive focus on fraud instead of “do-not-call” issues. See
supra at 3-4. This absence of enforcement is significant, since the record before the FTC
indicates that its enforcement actions generally reduce the problem addressed. 11
Lacking actual enforcement experience on “do-not-call,” the agencies pointed to the
number of complaints they received about telemarketing issues generally. For example, the
FCC claimed it needed to review its TCPA rules in part because it received “over 11,000
complaints” in two years. FCC NPRM at 17466. However, both agencies acknowledge such
complaint data is of doubtful relevance. The FCC regularly points out in its quarterly
statistical reports about complaints, including TCPA complaints, that “many … do not
involve violations” and “existence of a complaint does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing.”
E.g., Report on Informal Consumer Inquiries and Complaints, 2nd Quarter Calendar Year 2003 (CGB
Sept. 12, 2003). The FTC acknowledges that “[w]e do not know … from our complaints
anything other than the fact that we have received complaints.” DNC-Tr. at 99-100. (P.A.
0578-79)
At the conclusion of its rulemaking, the FCC admitted “that the increasing number of
inquiries and complaints about telemarketing practices should not form the basis upon which
we revise or adopt new rules under the TCPA.” FCC Order at 14140. Compare Gov. Br. 46,
48 (asserting complaint data is sufficient to demonstrate problem). The FCC had to make
this admission after ATA obtained access to a portion of the complaints through a FOIA
request, the review of which demonstrated the data failed to support the government’s initial
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Pechnik at 12. (P.A. 0334) Amicus AARP also informed the FCC that research the AARP had
conducted “has shown a pretty significant lack of knowledge of … the do not call right[.]” RR-Tr. at
408. (P.A. 0642)
9

The FTC staff noted “there’s nothing … more valuable than effective education of consumers[.]”
RR-Tr. at 406. (P.A. 0640) See also DNC-Tr. at 188 (P.A. 0600); News Release, New Year’s Resolutions for
Telecom Consumers, ¶ 5 (CGB Dec. 31, 2002).
10

See (P.A. at 0716-18) (“TSR Sweeps” provided by FTC under Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”), listing 87 cases alleging violations of the TSR, but none involving unwanted call
provisions, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.4(b)(1)(ii) or 310.4(b)(2)(i)-(iv)).
11

DNC-Tr. at 10 (P.A. 0571) (FTC’s “own complaint data” show “telemarketing fraud has
dropped as a complaint category in terms of its standing in our top ten”).
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claims.12 Of complaints ATA was able to obtain, nearly two-thirds had nothing to do with
“do-not-call” issues. ATA Comments at 89-90 & Exh. 16. (P.A. 0140-41, 0234-38) The
agencies’ inability to draw any conclusions based on complaint data is reinforced by record
evidence showing “do-not-call” complainants tend to focus on calls not subject to the rules,
from both commercial and noncommercial sources. 13
The Company-Specific Rules Work. The record showed the company-specific
option effectively minimized unwanted calls when the rules were understood and used.
Indeed, the FTC confirmed this conclusion by adopting the company-specific approach for
telemarketing by for-profit call centers on behalf of nonprofit organizations. FTC Order at
4637. A survey of 1,000 consumers submitted to the FCC showed that, while only about
one-third of respondents knew to ask to be on a telemarketer’s “do-not-call” list, almost
two-thirds who did so reported the requests stopped unwanted calls. 14 Similar evidence was
presented to the FTC. 15 Moreover, the FTC staff members repeatedly acknowledged that
noncompliance with the company-specific “do-not-call” requirement generally came from
entities that were exempt from the rules. 16
Identified Problems Were Addressed. The government asserts the companyspecific approach is flawed because, among other things, dead-air calls and premature hangups preclude “do-not-call” requests, inability to identify callers undermines requests and
12

The FCC denied ATA’s request to make the complaints available as part of the record. ATA
then requested them through FOIA, but the agency stalled production and imposed exorbitant fees.
ATA ultimately obtained 2420 (or 22%) of the complaints, FCC Order at 14139-40 & n.785, and
challenged the FCC’s stonewalling in court. (P.A. 0429-0561) (complaint in American Teleservices Ass’n v.
FCC, No. 03-1848 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 4, 2003)).
13

See DNC-Tr. at 215 (P.A. 0604a) (“one of the things we’ve identified … is that we don’t really
know what the magnitude of the problem is and what the source … is”). See also June 2002 Tr. at 206
(P.A. 0626) (State of Missouri testimony indicating about 40 percent of the complaints received were
“false positives,” including complaints directed toward exempt organizations and other irregularities);
ATA comments at 70 n.80 (P.A. 0121) (citing evidence from Idaho Attorney General that “half of the
complaints received in that office under the Idaho ‘do-not-call’ law since May 2, 2001 [were] from
exempt entities”); DNC-Tr. at 133 (P.A. 0589) (“the rule could be very effective and you wouldn’t
necessarily know it if you’re getting complaints [about] industry segments that are not within the rule”).
14

ATA comments at 73-74 & Exh. 12. (P.A. 0124-25, 0341) Another 9.5 percent of respondents
were not certain whether calls continued after they made the request. Id.
15

See RR-Tr. at 7 (P.A. 0639) (NCL acknowledgement that “the telemarketing rule works, it works
pretty well”); Brass-RR at 1 (P.A. 0339) (“I have found that the [TSR] works very well for me. Several
months ago I was receiving 6 or 7 unwelcome calls per week. Then I found out about the ‘Do-Not-Call’
lists[.] I began [using them and] I have not received a telemarketing call for quite some time.”). Others
found that “in most instances, when we ask … we receive no further phone calls” Hickman-RR at 1.
(P.A. 0341) Another noted that most telemarketers calling his home “follow the rules.” Bennett-RR
at 1. (P.A. 0340)
16

DNC-Tr. at 104 (P.A. 0583) (“looking at some of those complaints” and “from … experience,”
“repeat calls after asking to be put on the do-not-call list are coming from entities … not subject” to
the company-specific rules.). See also Know Your Caller Hearing at 28 (P.A. 0677) (FTC staff testimony that
“it is the parties who are exempt that keep calling”).
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hinders identification of violators, and consumers cannot verify they have been placed on a
“do-not-call” list. See, e.g., Gov’t Br. 10, 12 n.5, 28. Each of these alleged shortcomings was
addressed by the agencies through other less restrictive rules. For example, FTC and FCC
predictive dialer rules require telemarketers to “abandon” no more than three percent of all
calls, and even in that small percentage of cases to play a recording to identify the
telemarketer and provide its telephone number. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(4); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(a)(6). In addition, all telemarketers must pass through caller ID information
(telephone number and, where possible, company name). 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(7); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1601(e). Now, irrespective of the registry rules, virtually all consumers will connect to a
live sales agent with whom they can lodge a company-specific request. See, e.g., FTC Order at
4625; FCC Order at 14121; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(6). New rules also prohibit interfering with
the ability to make “do-not-call” requests. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii). The FCC also now
requires telemarketers to honor company-specific “do-not-call” requests as quickly as
technically possible, and in all cases within 30 days. FCC Order at 14069; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3).
The industry recommended additional steps that could have bolstered the companyspecific rules but were rebuffed by the agencies. E.g., FCC Order at 14068; DNC-Tr. at 200,
224. (P.A. 0601, 0605) These included requiring telemarketers to offer toll-free numbers or
websites for registering and/or confirming company-specific “do-not-call” requests. FCC
Order at 14068. Cf. DNC-Tr. at 28 (P.A. 0572) (AARP testimony requesting that “it [be]
easier for people to get on a do-not-call list”). Commenters also suggested affording
consumers other ways to confirm company-specific requests were processed. DNC-Tr. at
201. (P.A. 0602)
Call Volume. Record findings regarding the growing number of telemarketing calls
were presented without any sense of proportion or context, and do not demonstrate that
regulatory measures less restrictive than the DNCR will fail. E.g., Gov’t Br. 5. The
government merely states that “as many as 104 million calls [are placed] a day – a five-fold
increase in the last decade” without also considering other factors. Id. (citing, inter alia, FCC
Order at 14054). But this number is a meaningless statistic to the extent it does not also
disclose the proportional increase during this period with respect to telephone lines or calls
actually received. 17 Information submitted by consumer advocates indicated consumers
receive only a handful of telemarketing calls, perhaps even less than two per week on
average. 18 At the same time, nothing in the record indicated how many or what percentage
come from entities the government ultimately exempted from the registry, or the relative
growth of the exempt and non-exempt categories of calls. E.g., Gov. Br. 35 (“record does
not contain evidence of the precise percentage of telemarketing calls that the registry would eliminate”).
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With approximately 275 million telephone “lines” nationwide (based on residential and wireless
numbers that may be placed on the registry), this figure suggests Americans receive, on average, 2.64
telemarketing calls per week. But the FCC indicated (in a footnote) that the total number is substantially
lower because 41 percent of the 104 million are not completed (e.g., busy signals, no answer, or
answering machines). FCC Order at 14021 n.28.
18

An officer of Private Citizen submitted a log of the telemarketing calls he received over a three
year period from all sources, including commercial, political and charitable sources. The total amounted
to 1.6 calls per week, which he described as an “epidemic” of calls. ATA Reply Comments at 6 & n.11
(P.A. 0258); Letter from Ronald London, Counsel for ATA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC,
March 5, 2003. (P.A. 0760)
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“Fundamental Differences”. The government’s claim that differential treatment of
commercial and noncommercial callers rests on findings of “fundamental differences”
between different categories of telemarketers has grown in importance during the litigation
as a linchpin of the government’s justification of the DNCR scheme. But nothing in the
record supports this claim. Quite to the contrary, the FTC concluded specifically that
“consumers are disturbed by unwanted calls regardless of whether the caller is seeking to
make a sale or to ask for a charitable contribution.” FTC Order at 4637. The FCC similarly
has said there is no evidence to show “subscribers would find an advertising message more
offensive than a request for a charitable contribution or a political message or solicitation.”
FCC NOI Order, 77 F.C.C.2d at 1035. See also TCPA Report and Order at 8773.
The record confirms the Supreme Court’s insight that a “consumer’s interest in the
free flow of commercial information … may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day’s most urgent political debate.” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U .S. 748, 763 (1976). Whether a particular telemarketing call may
be “unwanted” or “expected” does not turn on whether the call was commercial or
noncommercial, but on whether its subject interests the recipient. In particular, the FTC
cited a study by the Information Policy Institute which found 50 percent of consumers
supported regulations that would allow local or community-based organizations or
businesses to call during specific hours. 19 Yet the rules adopted do not reflect these more
nuanced preferences, and instead established broad categories of favored and disfavored callers.
There was no finding that calls from commercial entities have a different impact on
privacy than calls from political or noncommercial sources. Rather, testimony before the
FTC and com ments filed with both agencies showed that consumer reactions are largely the
same regardless of the identity of the caller or the subject of the call. 20 The administrative
records were rife with comments indicating that noncommercial calls are no more welcome
than commercial calls, as is apparent even from just the relative handful the agencies
themselves cited to support the national registry. This was the case before both the FTC, 21
and the FCC. 22 Survey research submitted in the FCC proceeding confirmed that a full 84
19

FTC Order at 4593 (citing Michael A. Turner, Consumers, Citizens, Charity and Content: Attitudes
Toward Teleservices (Information Policy Institute, June 4, 2002)). The study also found 40 percent of
respondents would support rules that allow national companies to call if there is an established business
relationship.
20

DNC-Tr. at 154, 185 (P.A. 0591, 0597) (testimony of Private Citizen); id. at 91 (P.A. 0575)
(NARUC testimony).
21

FTC Order at 4626, 4628-29, 4646 (citing, e.g., Menefee-RR at 1 (P.A. 0342) (“I have … asked
repeatedly for one (non-Profit [telemarketer]) to stop soliciting money from me on the phone. But at
least once or twice a year they call again.”); Peters-RR at 1 (P.A. 0343) (“telemarketing calls come from
companies, including some from our favored charities, that we have repeatedly and consistently asked
to drop our names from their calling lists”)).
22

FCC Order at 14030, 14033, 14055 (citing, e.g., Hathaway at 1 (P.A. 0336) (“I do not want calls
even from charities which I may support [or] calls from political parties even if they are the party I vote
for.”); Reichenbach at 1 (P.A. 0337) (“When you begin the national DNC list, please do not allow an
exception for non-profits”); Gagnon at 1 (P.A. 0338) (“Automated calls promoting political
candidates … should also be banned.”)).
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percent of respondents found “calls from political candidates or promoting a political issue”
either less acceptable than (42.9 percent) or no different from (41.1 percent) other
unsolicited calls, and that 81 percent considered calls for charitable contributions either less
acceptable or no different from other calls. See ATA comments at 71-72 & Exh. 12. (P.A.
0122-23, 0222-28)
Nor did the record provide any basis for the government’s current assertion that
telemarketers who call on behalf of charities are “less likely to engage in abusive
telemarketing practices that might alienate the customer.” 23 Although the government
claims noncommercial solicitors have “different incentives” than commercial telemarketers,
and that charitable solicitors may be more receptive to company-specific rules (because
“some … had already set up their own ‘do-not-call’ lists”), Gov. Br. 49, these factors hardly
distinguish commercial from noncommercial telemarketers. Like noncommercial entities,
the record showed commercial callers have the same incentive to avoid alienating
prospective customers. E.g., ATA Comments at 42, 88, 102, 111 & Exh. 3; DMA
Comm ents, Exh. A at 8 (P.A. 0093, 0139, 0153, 0162, 0180-88, 0146) Moreover,
establishment of voluntary “do-not-call” lists does not does not set noncommercial entities
apart – DM A established the TPS, and many commercial telemarketers initiated individual
“do-not-call” lists. 24 Indeed, when it first established company-specific rules, the FCC noted
“[s]uch lists are already maintained on a voluntary basis by many telemarketers.” TCPA
Report and Order at 8773.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the government assumed incorrectly that some speakers “have rights that
others don’t” it misunderstood the delicate constitutional balancing that is required for
regulations designed to protect people from exposure to unwanted speech. Petitioners have
never disputed the government’s ability to adopt appropriately tailored regulation. But the
controlling principles – for both commercial and noncommercial speakers – are that any
limitations be both narrow and neutral. This is the central theme of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), which held that the
government cannot impose discriminatory regulations on commercial speech that bear no
relationship to the governmental interest at issue. Here, the differential regulations imposed
by the DNCR violate these principles, since a ringing phone at dinnertime has the same
effect on privacy, regardless of the identity of the caller or the subject of the call.
The DNCR is not comparable to the company-specific “do-not-mail” regulation the
Supreme Court upheld in Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Quite to the contrary,
Rowan supports the Petitioners in this case because it approved the use of a measure that in
all important respects is identical to the less restrictive company-specific “do-not-call”
approach. The Court held that the postal regulations were constitutional because that law
gave the individual recipient complete discretion and denied the government any
discretionary authority to determine what mail should be blocked, leaving the decision
entirely in the hands of the homeowner. Even though the law was designed only to block
“sexually provocative” mail, the Court in Rowan said that it was solely a matter for the
23

This claim is based entirely on a single comment in the FTC proceeding and is not backed by
any evidence whatsoever. See FTC Order at 4637.
24

The TPS list, which The DMA has operated since 1985, at the time of the rulemaking included
4.5 million consumers whom DMA members are required to refrain from calling under threat of
expulsion. DMA Comments at 7. (P.A. 0354)
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individual to judge, and that the homeowner could use the provision to stop the mailing of a
“dry goods catalog” if that was his preference. Here, by contrast, the DNCR is
unconstitutional because government decides which calls to block and which calls to permit
when a homeowner decides to list his number on the national registry. Additionally, its
Internet sign-up feature lacks verification and thus allows third parties to register households
on the DNCR without their knowledge or approval.
The DNCR also fails the Central Hudson test governing the regulation of commercial
speech. The government failed to meet its burden to prove that the rule will materially
advance its asserted goals. The registry has numerous exemptions and exclusions and the
government made no effort beyond guesswork to determine what proportion of calls would
be blocked for those who sign up. Nor did it seek to determine whether the calls that are
stopped by the DNCR correspond to individual preferences. The record in this proceeding
is far more nuanced, and suggests that the registry is significantly under- and over-inclusive.
Data from the TCPA legislative history and from the current record not only fail to support
the government’s assumptions, but undermine them.
The DNCR also is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored. Faced with
evidence that the registry would devastate the teleservices industry, the FTC and FCC
brushed these serious concerns aside and failed to weigh them. Bent on implementing the
FTC’s announced intention to impose a DNCR, they overlooked and failed to build a record
justifying their rejection of effective, less restrictive alternatives in violation of U S W est v.
FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2001). The most obvious of these was educating consumers
about, and beginning to enforce, preexisting company-specific “do-not-call” rules, which the
agencies concluded could be effective for certain callers. The record was clear that there
was widespread public ignorance of the rules, and that neither the FTC nor FCC had ever
enforced them. Additionally, the agencies did not consider the impact of the less restrictive
rules they adopted in addressing perceived inadequacies of the company-specific approach,
and they failed to adopt other such measures proposed by commenters. Finally, the
government failed to consider market-based solutions that have emerged since the TCPA
was adopted.
ARGUMENT
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THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO IMPLEMENT BALANCED

I.

RULES AS BOTH THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE TCPA REQUIRE
The government through the DNCR has engineered a selective ban based on its

estimation of the relative value of various types of speech. However, First Amendment
rights cannot be “balanced” by preserving some speakers’ rights while extinguishing others,
particularly where neither the FTC nor the FCC examined or tried to implement actual
consumer preferences regarding which calls to block and which to permit, and did not
examine their relative impact on privacy.
A.

The Government’s Limited Constitutional Analysis is
Deeply Flawed Because of its Preoccupation With
Commercial Versus Noncommercial Speech

From the beginning, clear thinking about the constitutional issues in this case has
been obscured by Chairman Muris’ unfortunate claim that “charities and religions have First
Amendment rights that others don’t have.” 25 The same goes for politicians, the regulation
of whose calls Chairman Muris simply remarked is “above my pay grade.” The FTC and
FCC assume they have greater latitude to restrict some forms of commercial telemarketing
because telemarketers are unpopular and because commercial speech sometimes may be
regulated more intensively than other expression. 26 It is from this faulty premise that many
of the government’s constitutional errors flow. 27
Petitioners have never disputed residential privacy as an interest that can be
supported by appropriately-tailored regulation.
But the categorical claim that “the
individual’s right to be left alone [in the privacy of his home] plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder,” Gov. Br. 31 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748-749 (1978)), fails to account for the careful balancing that is required when First
Amendment and privacy interests must be accommodated. This Court has examined the
“difficulties encountered in this age of exploding information, when rights bestowed by the
United States Constitution must be guarded as vigilantly as in the days of handbills on public
25

Remarks of Chairman Timothy J. Muris, FTC Press Conference, Dec. 18, 2002. See Ans. ¶ 62
(admitting Muris statement). Compare George Orwell, ANIMAL FARM 123 (1946) (“some animals are
more equal than others”).
26

See FTC Order at 4635-36 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) and
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).
27

Any suggestion that “the Government’s interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty
as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment.” United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (“national consensus” cannot justify restriction on speech). See United States
v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818, 826 (2000) (government cannot restrict speech “even with
the mandate or approval of a majority”). Compare Gov. Br. 35 (asserting “the popularity of the
government’s program” justifies it).
14

sidewalks.” U S WEST, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1999). It has cautioned
in the commercial speech context that “[i]n the name of deference to agency action,
important civil liberties, such as the First Amendment’s protection of speech, could easily be
overlooked.” Id. Here, it appears the agencies are hoping the Court will overlook these vital
issues as did the FCC in U S West.
It is important to recognize, as is written into the TCPA, that “pitting the First
Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling
viewers or auditors … demand[s] delicate balancing.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 208 (1975). Thus, despite the seemingly absolute language cited by the government
(e.g., “no one has the right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient,” Gov. Br. 3233 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000))), courts uniformly have permitted only
very narrow restrictions on speech in this area, both in the noncommercial and commercial
speech contexts. For example, in Hill, the Court approved only limited restrictions on
“sidewalk counselling” outside abortion clinics that had no “adverse impact on the readers’
ability to read signs displayed by demonstrators,” and did not preclude communication at a
“normal conversational distance.” 530 U.S. at 714, 726-727. Similarly, in Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474 (1988), the Supreme Court held a restriction on targeted residential picketing
must be narrowly tailored to permit picketers to disseminate their messages generally
through residential neighborhoods, including “go[ing] door-to-door to proselytize their
views” or “contact[ing] residents by telephone, short of harassment.” Id. at 483-484.
On the question of balance, the government’s reliance on Pacifica relates directly to
the factors prescribed in the TCPA, although not in the way the government intended. See
Gov. Br. 31. Even in the case of “indecent” broadcasts that may intrude into the home, the
Court held that any restrictions must be narrow. The “time channeling” approved in that
case applies only during a time of day when children are likely to be in the audience, Action for
Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying same
intermediate scrutiny as in commercial speech cases), and cannot be applied at all to
nonbroadcast media that permit homeowners to make individualized blocking decisions. 28
Notably, the TCPA was predicated on the understanding that no such individualized
blocking solutions existed to address concerns over telemarketing, Pub. L. No. 102-243,
§ 2(11), 105 Stat. 2394 (1991), but since its passage a range of technical alternatives have
evolved that give individuals a great deal of choice about the nature and volume of calls they
receive from all outside sources. 29
The required balancing is no different in cases involving commercial speech. Thus, in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Supreme Court struck down a
restriction on the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements designed “to protect
those recipients who might potentially be offended.” Id. at 72 (distinguishing Rowan because
28

E.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815 (cable television permits individualized blocking); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-131 (1989) (telephone technology permits
individualized blocking).
29

ATA Comments at 56-58, 89-92 & Exhs. 14-15 (P.A. 0107-09, 0140-43, 0229-33) (listing
technical options). Such developments are germane to whether the rules under review constitute a
“reasonable fit.” See infra Section II.B.3.b.
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the mail blocked by the postal rule was in “sole discretion” of homeowner). Where
restrictions on commercial speech are permitted to protect privacy, they must be narrow. In
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court upheld a 30-day moratorium on
direct-mail solicitation by attorneys to accident victims, a distinctly vulnerable class. The 5-4
decision was predicated on the majority’s finding that the restriction was “narrow both in
scope and duration” and on the ability to communicate using the same medium, i.e.,
non-directed mail, during the moratorium. Id. at 635 (emphasis added). See Revo v.
Disciplinary Bd., 106 F.3d 929, 935 (10th Cir. 1997).
At bottom, the government’s ability to shield “unwilling listeners” is the same
regardless whether speech is commercial or core political speech. 30 In either case,
regulations intended to protect privacy interests must be both narrow and neutral. 31 This
point was again illustrated in Action for Children’s Television where the D.C. Circuit struck down
a preferential “safe harbor” that barred commercial broadcasters from broadcasting
“indecent” programs during the same hours when noncommercial broadcasters were
unrestricted. 58 F.3d at 668-669 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410
(1993)). The decision was a straightforward application of the “bedrock principle” that the
government cannot “impose[ ] different restrictions on each of two categories of [speakers]
while failing to explain how this disparate treatment advance[s] its goal.” Id. at 669.
This, of course, is the core holding of Discovery Network, which invalidated a local
regulation premised solely on a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.
The Court articulated two general principles that apply fully here: (1) a distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech that “bears no relationship whatsoever to the
particular interests that the city has asserted” is invalid, and (2) a restriction that
overemphasizes the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech “seriously
underestimates the value of commercial speech.” 507 U.S. at 424. Subsequent cases
applying Discovery Network have made clear “it is unconstitutional to ban commercial speech
but not non-commercial speech – at least absent a showing that the commercial speech has
worse secondary effects.” Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1074 n.54 (3d Cir. 1994).
See also Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 1998).

30

Dictum in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002), is not to the contrary. See State Br. 15. That case struck down a requirement that individuals
wishing to engage in door-to-door advocacy must obtain a solicitation permit and display their names
while soliciting. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 165-69. The Court did not address a “do-not-solicit” provision
that “establishe[d] a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits.”
Unlike the DNCR, the ordinance did not dictate which solicitors to ban but instead allowed
homeowners to choose from nineteen separate categories of solicitors – including both commercial and
noncommercial speakers – they might block or permit. Id. at 157.
31

E.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 723 (upholding restriction on “sidewalk counselling” because it
“applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists and
missionaries”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 (1989) (regulation of sound
amplification to protect nearby residents denies government ability “to vary the sound quality
or volume based on the message being delivered”); Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428
(“prohibition against the use of sound trucks emitting loud and raucous’ noise in residential
neighborhoods is permissible if it applies equally to music, political speech and advertising.”)
(emphasis added).
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The government erroneously tries to limit the relevance of Discovery Network to the
analysis of Central Hudson’s “material advancement” requirement which is discussed below.
See infra Section II.B.2. But this ignores Discovery Network’s principal rationale – that a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speakers cannot be upheld if it bears
“no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted.” Id. at 424
(emphasis in original). The Court explained that “the principal reason for drawing a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech has little, if any, application to a
regulation of their distribution,” id. at 426 n.21, and questioned whether the commercial
speech doctrine was appropriate in such cases. Id. at 416 n.11. Here, the record makes clear
the DNCR suffers from the same infirmity as the Cincinnati ordinance in Discovery Network
because of its unjustified distinctions among speakers. As noted above, there is no substance
to the government’s claim of “fundamental differences” between commercial and
noncommercial. Compare supra at 15-18 with Gov. Br. 46-50. See also infra at 38-41.
B.
The DNCR Violates the First Amendment Because it
Imposes the Government’s Speech Preferences, Not the Individual’s
The district court correctly found that the DNCR “is a significant enough
governmental intrusion and burden on commercial speech to amount to a government
restriction implicating the First Amendment.” Mainstream Marketing, 2003 WL 22213517 at
*10. The response that a “decision to place a number on the registry is voluntary,” and “akin
to a ‘NO SOLICITORS’ sign whereby consumers may indicate that they do not want any
further unsolicited commercial telemarketing calls,” Gov. Br. 11, 21 (caps in original), is
inapt because it overlooks the government’s role in defining which callers are restricted.
Consumers may choose whether to place numbers on the DNCR, but the government decides
which callers – both commercial and noncommercial – are blocked by the law.
The rules’ odd collection of coverages and exemptions is far from a simple “no
solicitation” sign. Political solicitations are never covered by the law, while charitable or
religious organizations may (or may not) be subject to a company-specific “do-not-call”
requirement depending on who places the call, even if they call about the same cause and use
identical scripts. The same is true for businesses – exempt and non-exempt companies are
treated differently even when they are competing directly against each other in marketing the
same or similar products. See CompTel Br. 3-6.
The DNCR cannot legitimately be compared to the postal regulations in Rowan v. Post
Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), because the government has chosen which calls will be blocked when
consumer names are placed on the DNCR. In fact, Rowan supports Petitioners, not the
government, as the law upheld there operates almost exactly like the company-specific
requirements elsewhere in the final rules. At issue in Rowan was a company-specific opt-out
requirement “intended to allow the addressee complete and unfettered discretion in electing
whether … he desired … further material from a particular sender.” 397 U.S. at 734. Here,
by imposing the DNCR requirement (on top of company-specific rules), the government
chose a very different approach. See Mainstream Marketing, 2003 WL 22213517 at *10
(“mechanism purportedly created by the FTC to effectuate consumer choice instead
influences consumer choice”). In Rowan, the Court relied heavily upon the fact that the
postal statute was amended by the House in order “to remove ‘the right of the Government
17

to involve itself in any determination of the content and nature of these objectionable
materials,’” thus removing all discretion from the government. 397 U.S. at 733. Moreover,
the Court concluded that “Congress provided this sweeping power [to allow homeowners to
request prohibitory orders to block unsolicited erotic mail] not only to protect privacy but to
avoid possible constitutional questions that might arise from vesting the power to make any
discretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental official.” 32
Thus, the purportedly “voluntary” nature of the registry does not avoid constitutional
problems where the government controls the speakers to whom the restrictions apply.
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), struck down a ban on door-to-door solicitation
because it “substitute[d] the judgment of the community for the judgment of the individual
householder.” Id. at 144. While the Court indicated that homeowners instead could erect
“no solicitation” signs, the ordinance would have fared no better if it permitted residents
only to erect “no solicitation” signs that selectively barred speakers disfavored by the town
council. Ultimately, constitutional protection is based on the principle that “the speaker and
the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented.” Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). For precisely this reason, Pearson rejected a similar attempt to
expand Rowan to a discriminatory opt-out, pointing out that “[i]n Rowan, a homeowner could
prevent any material from entering his home.” 153 F.3d at 404 (citing 397 U.S. at 737).
The government confuses the constitutional question presented in Rowan and tries to
frame it as a com mercial speech case, which it clearly is not. 33 It observes the postal
regulation applies only to “advertisements,” but that says nothing about whether the
communication involved would be considered commercial speech in a constitutional sense.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (editorial advertisement is political
speech). As the government is well aware, advertisements by political candidates may well
run afoul of the restrictions on “erotically arousing or sexually provocative” materials. 34
Indeed, the sole case the government cites for its claim that the postal regulation restricts
only “commercial” matter proves just the opposite point. The court in United States Postal
Service v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1986), held only that the rules
could not be used to block the sending of Hustler magazine to members of Congress in their
offices because it would interfere with the right to petition the government. But the court
32

Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737. Moreover, the statute in Rowan hinged upon the Postmaster General
receiving an opt-out notice “from the addressee,” id. at 730, and thus truly involved opt-out decisions
by the mail recipient. By contrast, the DNCR allows individuals to register anonymously over the
Internet many phone numbers at one time. FTC Order at 4639. This has already resulted in individuals
being placed on the DNCR by third parties without their knowledge or approval. Valentine & Kennelly
Affidavits. (P.A. 0734-59)
33

Gov. Br. 40-42. Rowan was decided in 1970, well before the Supreme Court extended First
Amendment protection to commercial speech. See Virginia Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). If the commercial nature of the mailings had been dispositive, the
Court simply would have found no First Amendment issue since such material was unprotected at the
time.
34

The FCC has taken the position that candidate advertisements by Larry Flynt could be
considered obscene and therefore exempt from “reasonable access” requirements under the
Communications Act. See Letter from Chairman Mark Fowler to Congressman Thomas A. Luken, (Jan.
19, 1984) (described in Harvey Zuckman, et. al, 3 MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 186 (West Group
1999). See also Reuters, Porn Candidate Mary Carey Buys Ad Time on Leno, Oct. 3, 2003 (P.A. 0719).
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observed that the postal regulation could be used to block such politically-motivated mailings
to the residences of congressmen, just as it could be used by other homeowners. 35 With
respect to congressional offices, however, the court held that the requested prohibitory order
barring the mailing of Hustler magazine was unconstitutional because it was “rooted in
content discrimination.” Id. at 871.
As with the rest of its constitutional argument, the government here tries to make far
too much of the fact that its rules target commercial speech. But it cannot explain how the
DNCR, which expressly dictates which calls are blocked and which ones get through, can be
compared to a post office rule in which “the power of the householder … is unlimited; he
may prohibit the mailing of a dry goods catalog because he objects to the contents.” Rowan,
397 U.S. at 737. Senate Amici, in a brief prepared by Dean Rodney Smolla, contend “there
was content-based regulation in Rowan,” and that the district court here “appeared
disproportionately influenced by … Discovery Network.” Senate Br. 15, 17 (emphasis original).
Perhaps the best answer to this argument was put forward by Dean Smolla himself, when he
testified just one month ago to the Senate Commerce Committee that the DNCR appears to
be “in tension with current First Amendment doctrines, especially decisions such as Discovery
Network.” He concluded the best way to ensure that “do-not-call” rules are constitutional “is
to pattern the registry after the postal rules upheld in Rowan, permitting consumers to block
all unsolicited calls, from whatever source.” (P.A. 0732) Indeed.
THE DNCR IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
II.
The government fails to meet its burden of proof under Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 36 As a threshold matter, Central Hudson
analysis asks whether a regulation involves truthful speech and legal activity. If so, the
regulation may be upheld only if it (1) is needed to serve an important governmental interest;
(2) directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) is narrowly tailored to restrict no
more speech than necessary. Id. at 564-565. It is the government’s burden to build a record
“adequate to clearly articulate and justify” any limitation. Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v.
Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1069 (10th Cir. 2001) (“ULBA”) (quoting U S West, 182 F.3d at
1234). In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has made clear it will not uphold restrictions
on commercial speech backed only by “unsupported assertions,” Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus.
& Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 143 (1994), or even “anecdotal evidence and educated guesses.”
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U .S. 476, 490 (1995). See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 505 (1996).

35

Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 871 (“In the home a Member can invoke the special privileges as a
householder, including the privilege of stopping undesirable mail under § 3008.”).
36

Petitioners do not concede the DNCR’s discriminatory restrictions warrant less than strict
scrutiny, Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416 n.11, but they are invalid even under the standard typically
applied in commercial speech cases.
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A.

This Case Involves Truthful Speech About
Products and Services

Lawful

This case is solely about regulating honest businesses. There is no claim that the
telemarketing activities addressed by the DNCR involve misleading speech or unlawful
activities. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416. Yet the government and supporting amici
inexplicably cite legislative history of the Telemarketing Act, with its focus on “[i]nterstate
telemarketing fraud,” as justification for the DNCR. Gov. Br. 8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6101);
House Br. 9-10, 13-15; AARP Br. 1-16. However, the Telemarketing Act related almost
entirely to issues of fraud, while the TCPA was premised on recognizing “the legitimacy of
telemarketing industry.” See First TCPA Order at 8753; U.S. Security v. FTC, 2003 WL
22203719 *5 (Congress was not contemplating “do-not-call” issues with the Telemarketing
Act). The government’s lack of precision in framing the issues has spawned confusion about
the nature of the interests involved. For example, this Court referred to the legislative
history of the Telemarketing Act and congressional findings regarding fraudulent activity.
FTC v. Mainstream M ktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003). But fraud issues are
the subject of entirely different rules having nothing to do with “do-not-call” or the
overwhelming majority of the teleservices industry. See supra at 3-4, 11 & n.1 (congressional
statements). The FTC in the past has drawn a sharp distinction between the two. Id.
Accordingly, this Court must focus on the remaining elements of the Central Hudson test.
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B.

The DNCR Fails C e n tra l H u d s o n
1.

The Government Failed to Demonstrate a
Substantial Need for the DNCR
residential privacy
............................................................................................................................................................................................
as a general proposition has never been disputed. But
as this Court cautioned, “the government cannot satisfy” Central Hudson “by merely asserting
a broad interest in privacy,” U S West, 182 F.3d at 1234-35, so it cannot demonstrate its
interest by merely naming an activity that may impinge upon privacy. It must demonstrate
its interest in the particular regulations it proposes to adopt. It is worth noting, then, that
this case does not involve attempts to intimidate individuals seeking medical treatment, Gov.
Br. 25 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-717), wiretapping, id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)), or people held captive by targeted picketing.
Id. at 32 (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485). Rather, description of the government’s interest as
enabling consumers to block calls that are “intrusive” because they demand “immediate
attention,” Gov. Br. 32, underscores that it chose a content-based solution to address a
content-neutral problem. 37

ether calls are made
............................................................................................................................................................................................
either by covered entities or by exempt entities under
the DNCR. As the Eighth Circuit explained in Van Bergen, the identical concern arises from
political calls to the same degree as commercial calls. The interest was substantial, according
to the court, “because the recipient [of an automated call] has no opportunity to indicate the
desire to receive such calls.” 59 F.3d at 1555. On this basis it upheld rules that give “the
recipient … the opportunity to tell the operator, at any point in the conversation, that he

37

The two cases cited for this proposition involved content-neutral regulation of automatic dialing
machines, not “do-not-call” regulations. See Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir 1995);
Minnesota v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W. 2d 882 (Minn. 1992).
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does not want to hear from the calling person or entity again.” Id. In short, the substantial
interest was sufficient to justify company-specific rules.

o show a substantial
............................................................................................................................................................................................
interest in rules that go beyond a company-specific
approach and it seeks authority to dictate which categories of speech are blocked by the
DNCR. Similar issues arose in Playboy, where the three-judge district court had no difficulty
finding a compelling interest in the general proposition – protecting children from unwanted
sexually-oriented images in the home

38

– but nevertheless held the government failed to

meet its burden of demonstrating the law at issue was “necessary to serve a compelling
interest.”

39

The court found the government could not show existing regulations were

inadequate, and was particularly concerned about lack of public awareness of less restrictive
regulatory options (voluntary household-by-household blocking), explaining that “[i]f the
[less restrictive] blocking option is not being promoted, it cannot become a meaningful
alternative.”

40

In affirming, the Supreme Court agreed the less restrictive but unpublicized

option had not been given a “fighting chance.”

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 819.

Here, the

government may have shown a general interest in residential privacy, or even in adopting
company-specific rules, but it has failed to show a substantial need for the DNCR where

38

Playboy Entmt. Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 786 (D. Del. 1996). On this basis
the court denied Playboy injunctive relief based on an initial finding that it was unlikely to prevail, id.
at 790, but later ruled for Playboy on the merits. See infra note 39.
39

Playboy Entmt. Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp.2d 702, 713 (D. Del. 1998), aff’d, 529 U.S.
803 (2000). It is immaterial that Playboy was a strict scrutiny case while this is a Central Hudson case.
Whether the government must show a “compelling” interest or merely an “important or substantial”
interest, it nevertheless must demonstrate the harm is real and additional restrictions are needed to
alleviate it. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-771.
40

Playboy, 30 F.Supp.2d. at 712. State amici inaccurately compare the less restrictive rule in Playboy
to the DNCR because it permitted blocking by individual homeowners. State Br. 28. But the two
restrictions would be comparable only if the government had prescribed a list of channels not of the
individual’s choosing to be blocked upon homeowner request. Such a rule was not at issue in Playboy
and would never have been upheld in that case.
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there is widespread public ignorance about the company-specific rules and neither the FTC
nor FCC has ever enforced them.
2.

The Government Failed to Prove the DNCR
Will Materially Advance its Interest

will advance its goals
to a material degree. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-771. This cannot be accomplished through
speculation and conjecture or “conclusory assertion[s].”

ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1074.

Numerous courts have held that “exemptions and inconsistencies bring into question [a
law’s] purpose,” thereby precluding it from directly and materially achieving its objectives.
Rubin 514 U.S. at 489. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
189 (1999); ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1071-74. Here, the government claims to have met its
burden by adopting a measure to lessen telemarketing calls by some unspecified amount.
While acknowledging the registry “does not seek … to eliminate all [unsolicited] telephone
calls,” the government assumes each call it blocks serves its purpose of “reducing the number
of unwanted telephone solicitations.” Gov. Br. 35 (emphasis in original). But whether it
chooses to characterize its purpose as limiting the aggregate number of calls or surgically
excising undesired communications, the government falls woefully short of meeting its burden.
The government’s admission that “the record does not contain evidence as to the
precise percentage of telemarketing calls that the registry would eliminate” reveals a gift for
understatement. Id. The FTC Order offers only the initial “guesstimate” that the registry will
block 40 to 60 percent of commercial telemarketing calls, FTC Order at 4634, while FCC did
not even do that. As it turns out, however, neither agency had even the slightest support for
its claims. See Mainstream Mktg., 2003 WL 22213517 *4 n.1. Pressed on this point below, the
23

FTC was unable to cite any data, analysis or other evidence to support its estimate of the
percentage of calls expected to be blocked (which by then had grown to 80 percent):
THE COURT: Where did you come up with this astonishing figure
that you’re going to … affect 80 percent of these calls?
MR. DeMILLE-WAGMAN: Your Honor, we based that figure on
the estimation … that was made by direct marketing – by the ATA of
the percentage of jobs that would be lost.
THE COURT: Really?
Stay Tr. at 7. (P.A. 0007) See also Gov. Br. 35 n.9 (acknowledging estimated reduction in calls
rests on industry prediction of lost business). This admission is stunningly ironic, since both
agencies dispute there will be any economic losses at all. FCC Order at 14029; FTC Order at
4631-32 (claiming rules will benefit telemarketers).
The FTC ultimately conceded “there is no record in this case other than that figure,”
based solely on potential job losses by the telemarketing industry, to support government
claims regarding the registry’s potential impact. Stay Tr. at 8 (P.A. 0008) (emphasis added).
The agency acknowledged “we cannot give … an exact percentage that will be blocked,” or
even a reasonable approximation. Id. at 9. (P.A. 0009) The district court noted the estimate
“has crescendoed through the course of this lawsuit and taken on a life of its own with no
reference to the factual record.” Mainstream Mktg., 2003 WL 22232209*3 n.1. It concluded
“[t]here is nothing whatsoever in the administrative record or the record before this court,
beyond the FTC’s ipse dixit, to support this amalgam.” Id.
Lacking any factual support the government seeks refuge in a lax standard of review.
It quotes United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993), for the proposition that it
is not required to “make progress on every front before it can make progress on any front.”
Gov. Br. 36, 38. But see Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 194-95 (distinguishing
Edge); News America Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 815 (D.C. C ir 1988) (“courts reject the
facile one-bite-at-a-time explanation for rules affecting important First Amendment values”).
Extrapolating from Edge Broadcasting, the government assumes it satisfies Central Hudson if it
can reasonably presume to reduce telemarketing calls by at least 11 percent. 41 But this is a
blatant misreading of Edge Broadcasting. The Court quite clearly explained the lower courts
had “asked the wrong question” in focusing on the percentage of the audience affected, and
the proper inquiry was whether the federal law “support[ed] the anti-gambling policy of a
State like North Carolina.” Id. at 427-428. Analyzed this way, the law by definition served its
purpose 100 percent of the time.
The Court confirmed this reading of Edge in a subsequent case in which it confronted
the same question at issue here – whether exemptions from a law designed to reduce the
incidence of certain messages reaching their audience affect the Central Hudson inquiry. In
41

In Edge, the district court and court of appeals invalidated a federal ban on the broadcast of
lottery advertisements in states where lotteries were illegal. They reasoned that the material
advancement prong of Central Hudson was not met in barring a North Carolina station from carrying
lottery ads where it accounted for only 11 percent of the listening time in its area of service, where
Virginia stations could air lottery ads.
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Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 194-195 & n.8, the Court explained the regulation
in Edge was upheld only because of the limited government interest of supporting the law in
non-lottery states. But where its purpose is reducing the total number of “undesirable”
commercial communications – as it is here – exemptions from coverage are fatal under
Central Hudson. Id. at 193-94. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489; ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1071-74.
Additionally, Edge Broadcasting has been superceded by cases that tightened Central Hudson’s
“substantial advancement” requirement, 42 and was not followed by this Court in ULBA, 356
F.3d at 1073-74.
Failing to prove the aggregate reduction, the government asserts that each
commercial call it blocks is unwanted because, after all, the consumer decided to list his or
her number on the DNCR. Gov. Br. 32, 35. But this assumption is entirely unsupported.
The FTC itself described the overbroad reach of the DNCR, which blocks all calls in a given
category – including calls the consumer “would not mind receiving” – as distinguished from
a company-specific approach that perfectly reflects individual preferences. FTC Order at
4636. The record shows “consumers preferred a ‘nuanced approach’ to the ‘do-not-call’
issue, wanting to limit some calls to their household, but not all calls.” Id. at 4593. The
DN CR’s content categories do not match these preferences, since individual choices are not
defined by commercial versus noncommercial considerations. Consumers do not mind
receiving calls from certain businesses, id. at 4593 (citing IPI Study), while the FTC found
consumers can be “disturbed by unwanted calls regardless of whether the caller is seeking to
make a sale or to ask for a charitable contribution.” Id. at 4637. The FCC had no data
whatsoever on the broad range of consumer preferences, since it cautioned commenters at
the outset not to submit information on political, charitable or religious telemarketing. See
supra note 6.
Because the agencies collected no current data on this issue the government relies
exclusively on a 12-year-old reference in the TCPA legislative history for its conclusions that
commercial calls cause the most problems and noncommercial calls are less intrusive because
they are more “expected.” 43 The government’s repeated citation to this old data – at least
six references in the current brief alone – highlights the poverty of the current record on this
issue. There is no attempt to explain what makes a political or charitable call more
“expected,” since “the imperious ring of the telephone” is the same regardless of the
purpose of the call. The absence of any distinction is clearly illustrated by the current record.
See supra notes 7, 16, 21-22.
In any event, the government’s citation of the TCPA’s legislative history is highly
misleading. It grossly distorts the data in the House Report to suggest that complaints
regarding commercial solicitations “ranged from 80 to 99 percent” when that information
was drawn from only a handful of the states that had statistical information “readily
available.” H. Rep. 102-317 at 16. The government fails to disclose that up to half of the
42

Edge relied on Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), which
has been effectively overruled. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510. See also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2, 48991.
43

Gov. Br. 6, 7, 26, 46, 47, 48. The same data is repeated in cases the government cites. E.g.,
Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003); Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d
54 (9th Cir. 1995).
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complaints in other states mentioned in the House Report (including New York, Tennessee,
Nevada, and W ashington) related to charitable or political calls. Id. This remarkable finding
undoubtedly understates the problem, since state telemarketing laws almost all exempt
political and charitable calls. The current record also shows that states currently receive a
substantial number of complaints for calls from exempt categories. See supra note 13.
It is significant that the House Report data relates solely to complaints, since the
government has acknowledged “complaints about telemarketing practices should not form
the basis upon which we revise or adopt new rules under the TCPA.” FCC Order at 14140.
See supra at 11-12. The House report data – now being presented as dispositive – did not
persuade Congress in 1991 to cut off further inquiry. Instead, it directed the FCC to
monitor the issue, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D), acknowledging that charitable or political calls
can “represent as serious a problem as commercial solicitations.” H. Rep. 102-317 at 16-17.
This is important because the TCPA delegated to the FCC the task of maintaining the proper
constitutional balance. But the government here abdicated its responsibility by intentionally
avoiding collection of updated information in this critical area. See supra note 6.
Consequently, the record compiled below fails to show the DNCR materially furthers its interest.
The revisionist account of the legislative history in the House amicus brief fares no
better in its attempt to pin the problem on commercial callers. Much of the brief is devoted
to discussion of fraud or abuse issues and legislative history of the Telemarketing Act that is
both irrelevant to this case and factually incorrect. 44 The quoted fragments of witness
testimony and M ember comments on “do-not-call” issues are highly misleading. While the
brief cites 1991 testimony of Robert Bulmash of Private Citizen to suggest commercial calls
are different from other categories, House Br. 7, it overlooks Mr. Bulmash’s statement to the
FTC in 2000 that “when I’m called from the shower, when I’m called from dinner for a
solicitation … I don’t care if it’s a nonprofit, a survey or a solicitation call. I feel strongly
that a national do-not-call database should include the options of getting off sales, survey
and fundraising calls.” DNC-Tr. 155. (P.A. 0592) And while it quotes congressman Dingell
for the proposition that exempting charitable solicitations is “common sense,” it omits his
statement that rules should “maximize consumer choice [by] allowing individuals to receive
the calls they want and to avoid those they do not,” as well as the statements of other
Members indicating that exempt political and charitable calls are the most problematic. 45
Notably, as Rep. Tauzin has pointed out with respect to exemptions, if consumers “still get
44

House Br. 9-10, 13-15. Compare supra at 3-5, 31-32 (discussing different objectives of
Telemarketing Act and TCPA). The claim that “none of the … evidence before Congress identified
similar problems by charitable telemarketers” is false. See Brief for the United States and the Federal
Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 123 S.Ct.
1829 (2003), 2002 WL 31907178, at *8 (detailing examples of abuse and “misrepresentations … typical
of the charitable solicitation frauds that the federal government prosecutes both civilly and criminally”).
45

Do Not Call List Authorization Hearing, Jan. 8, 2003 at 7. See also id. at 32 (statement of
Chairman Tauzin) (“I personally am offended by all the recorded calls from politicians … I know a lot
of folks who are tired of hearing [these] messages”); id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Cox) (“there is no reason
to grant preferred status to political calls, which are often the most annoying of all”); id. at 4 (statement
of Rep. Barton) (registry should include political and charitable calls); id. at 10-11 (statement of Rep.
Terry) (listing less restrictive technical options that would be preferable to “kill[ing] an industry”); id. at
30 (statement of Rep. Deal) (people will continue to get calls that bother them); id. at 34-35 (FTC
response to Rep. Burr that it conducted no “studies or surveys” to determine which calls consumers find
most annoying).
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political solicitations [and] nonprofit solicitations … during the so-called dinner hour … my
suspicion is that [they] would think that the legislation was a fraud.” 46
3.
The DNCR is Not Narrowly Tailored
The government also fails to satisfy the requirement that its restriction be “no more
restrictive than necessary.” See ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1075. Under this requirement, it must
“carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed.”
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). In
addition, if it could “achieve its interests in a manner that … restricts less speech, the
Government must do so.” Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (emphasis
added). Indeed, the DNCR virtually ensures restriction of far more speech than necessary
because it allows anyone with an email address to use the Internet to place multiple telephone
numbers – including those of other people – on the DNCR without their knowledge or
approval. FTC Order at 4639; Valentine & Kennelly Affidavits. (P.A. 0734-59) As a direct
result, the DNCR will block speech to persons who have not made an individualized decision
consenting to such a restriction on commercial telephone solicitations to their homes,
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in

sharp contrast to the individual opt-out system at issue in Rowan.
While it is true “least restrictive means” analysis does not apply to commercial speech,
this Court has noted that the government must carefully consider the existence of obvious,
more narrowly tailored alternatives in evaluating the fit between means and ends. U S West,
Inc., 182 F.3d at 1239; Revo, 106 F.3d at 935. The government has the burden to show the
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Know Your Caller Act Hearing at 76. (P.A. 0697) The House amicus brief also mischaracterizes the
study in the 1991 House Report as finding “just ten percent of complaints about telemarketing involved
charitable calls,” House Br. 9, when the figure it cites applies to only one state – Rhode Island – while
the remaining data and reservations in the Report go unmentioned. See supra at 39.
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See, e.g. C. Mayer, Sorry Wrong Number on Registry, WASH . POST , at E1 (Oct. 18, 2003).
27

required fit through an adequate factual record.

48

Here, however, in their rush to fulfill the

pre-ordained conclusion of their rulemakings, the FTC and FCC ignored both these
fundamental requirements.
a.

The Government Failed
Assess Regulatory Costs

to

Neither agency made any serious effort to weigh the impact of the proposed
restriction on commercial free speech, the telemarketing industry, or the economy as whole.
They had no idea, and did not bother to study, what volume of commercial telemarketing
calls the restriction would suppress, much less how many calls would be blocked that
customers are interested in receiving.

Although the record showed the DCNR would

devastate the telemarketing industry, resulting in lay-offs for as much as 50 percent of the
industry, FTC Order at 4631; ATA Reply Comments at 26-30; ATA Ex Partes (all providing
evidence of adverse impact) (P.A. 0077-81, 0306-22), the FTC and FCC each brushed off the
evidence in a single sentence without any further inquiry. FTC Order at 4632; FCC Order at
14031, 14039. They did so even though the TCPA, not to mention the First Amendment,
requires careful consideration of these efforts. U S West, 182 F.3d at 1238-39; ULBA, 256
F.3d at 1075 (regulation is invalid where there is no indication the government “made any
careful calculation of the costs associated with its speech restrictions”).
The claim that the DNCR does not restrict speech because it only allows consumers
to “opt in” to a list, Gov. Br. 40, ignores the government’s own findings.

The FTC

illustrated this point when it decided to subject charitable solicitations only to companyspecific requirements and not the DNCR. It stated it was:
48

This Circuit does not accept agency justifications not found in its record or that are vague or
inconclusive. U S West, 182 F.3d at 1239 (rejecting reliance on “common sense” and insufficiently
specific empirical study to satisfy burden to prove narrow tailoring). Nor has this Court accepted the
type of post hoc rationalizations that litter the government’s brief. See ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1075.
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concerned that subjecting charitable solicitation telemarketing –
along with commercial telemarketing to solicit sales of goods
and services – to national “do-not-call” registry requirements
may sweep too broadly, because it could, for example, prompt
some consumers to accept the blocking of charitable solicitation
calls that they would not mind receiving, as an undesired but
unavoidable side-effect resulting from signing up for the registry
to stop sales solicitation calls.
FTC Order at 4636. See id. at 4634 (citing evidence that DNCR would reduce donor pool by
40 to 50 percent, and up to 80 percent in some states). This concern is well-founded, though
the FTC wrongly assumed the same concerns were irrelevant with respect to all commercial
calls. The FTC specifically found applying the national registry to nonprofits was not narrowly
tailored because it would not accurately reflect specific consumer preferences.
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Conversely,

it found the company-specific approach constitutional because there is a “direct correlation
between the governmental interest and the regulatory means employed to advance that
interest: The consumer requests a specific caller not to call again, and the regulation requires
the caller to make a record of and honor that request in the future.” Id. at 4636.
The government misses the point in suggesting a ban on telemarketing or a
requirement that consumers “opt in” to calls would be even more restrictive than the
DNCR. Gov. Br. 40. Of course it would be. But the relevant question is not whether the
government could have acted more restrictively, nor does the inquiry turn on the total
amount of speech it will suppress – it is whether the restriction was “more restrictive than
necessary.” ULBA, 256 F.3d at 1075; Playboy, 30 F. Supp.2d at 718 (“The question is not the
significance of the totality of the effects [but] the relative burden of one solution versus
49

The FTC agreed with non-profit organizations opposing the DNCR, finding it would be “too
costly … to obtain prospective donors’ express permission to call, and too difficult for consumers to
exercise their right to hear from them.” Consequently, it concluded the DNCR was not narrowly
tailored. Id. at 4636.
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another.”). See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 758-759
(1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate restrictions on unsolicited “indecent”
speech where government failed to build record on possible alternatives).

Here, the

government never developed the necessary record because it had announced its preferred
solution – the DNCR – from the outset.
b.

The G o ve rn m ent F ailed to
C o n si d e r L ess Re stric tiv e
Alternatives

This Court has been clear that “existence of an obvious and substantially less
restrictive means for advancing the desired government objective indicates a lack of narrow
tailoring” and that the government must build a record showing such alternatives “would not
sufficiently protect … privacy.”

U S West, 182 F.3d at 1238 n. 11, 1239.

Here, the

government’s assertion that there are no “numerous and obvious less burdensome
alternatives” to the DNCR, Gov. Br. 28, is totally undermined by its conclusion that the
company-specific rules are substantially less restrictive and can be effective. FTC Order at
4636. Its repeated conclusory references to “experience” to show that company-specific
rules are inadequate (but only in the commercial context) mean very little where the record
demonstrates conclusively most people were ignorant of the rules and neither the FTC nor
FCC ever enforced them. See supra at 9-12.
This lack of enforcement is fatal under Central Hudson. In Revo, for example, this
Court held that, to justify a restriction on solicitations, the government must demonstrate
“the existing regulations (or enhanced enforcement of those regulations)” would not
materially address its objective. 106 F.3d at 936. Here, the utter failure to enforce the
company-specific rules not only calls into question post hoc characterizations of the record, it
shows efforts to enforce the company-specific rules were an obvious, entirely untested
30

alternative that would not restrict constitutionally protected speech. Under Revo, failure even
to evaluate whether “enhanced enforcement” of company-specific requirements would
materially address the desired objective renders the DNCR invalid. Id. at 936.
Here, the record shows most consumers were unaware of the company-specific
option. See supra at 9-10. Thus, another obvious alternative was educating consumers about
the availability of this option in much the same way the government now is energetically
publicizing the DNCR.
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Failure to explore this obvious alternative fails Central Hudson

scrutiny. U S West, 182 F.3d at 1239 (agency must address whether customers, if notified of
opportunity to prevent company from using their personal information, would use available
protections). See also Verizon Northwest v. Showalter, 2003 WL 22160434 at *6-7 (W.D. Wa.
Aug. 26, 2003) (“regulations that address the form, content and timing of opt-out notices,
when coupled with a campaign to inform consumers of their rights, can ensure that
consumers are able to properly express their privacy preferences.”). Cf. Playboy, 30 F.Supp.2d
at 712 (if less restrictive alternative is not promoted “it cannot become a meaningful
alternative”). As the Supreme Court has noted, education campaigns may be both more
effective at advancing state interests and more narrowly tailored than speech restrictions. See
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.
To whatever extent the record shows problems with the company-specific rules,
other new rules address any alleged shortcomings. For example, the FTC added a provision
prohibiting companies from interfering with efforts to be placed on companies’ do-not-call
lists. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii). In addition, rules governing abandoned calls and Caller ID
50

Cf. DNC-Tr. at 92 (P.A. 0576) (Vermont study indicated state agency’s education efforts had
“substantial impact” on number of consumers asserting rights under existing laws to prevent unwanted
telephone calls).
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address other problems the government identified in justifying the DNCR. E.g., 16 C.F.R.
§§ 310.4(b)(4), 310.4(a)(7); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(a)(6), 64.1601(e). Before the FTC and FCC
condemn other aspects of their own new rules as somehow inadequate to fix problems
identified with company-specific rules, they must allow these less restrictive measures to be
“tested over time.” Sable, 492 U.S. at 128-129. In addition, the government failed to adopt
other obvious and less restrictive alternatives – including postcard confirmation of companyspecific requests, 800-number or Internet sign-ups, or requiring equipment necessary to
receive requests from persons with disabilities – that would have made the company-specific
requirement even more effective. See e.g., Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 758-759.
Other than acknowledging Caller ID as a valuable tool to prevent unwanted calls and
barring telemarketers from blocking Caller ID, e.g., FTC Order at 4626-27, the government
completely failed to consider technological alternatives for preventing unwanted calls, as
required by the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(A). These options include call rejection and no
solicitation services, and numerous consumer devices. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text. Neither agency reviewed the effectiveness of the devices except that the FCC asserted
that a few did not work well, and rejected them all on the ground that they imposed costs to
consumers, without mentioning their cost.

51

But criticisms of these technologies, Gov. Br.

43-44, are entirely unsupported by the record, and precisely the sort of post hoc speculation
U S West forbids. The existence of a growing number of market-based solutions is directly
relevant to whether new regulations provide a “reasonable fit,” particularly since the TCPA is
premised on the outdated assumption that no such technologies exist. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. Additionally, the FTC and FCC chose not to publicize the entirely
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FCC Order at 14041. While some electronic devices involve modest costs, others, such as Caller
ID, are increasingly bundled with basic telephone service.
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content-neutral DMA Telephone Preference Service, which the record indicated provides
4.5 million consumers with effective protection against telemarketing calls.

DMA

Comments at 7-8.
The government contends its “layered approach” involving multiple regulatory
requirements demonstrates narrow tailoring, Gov. Br. 42-43, but it instead creates the
opposite presumption. The overlapping rules are not “nuanced.” They are redundant. The
combination of available less restrictive options shows that the government could have
served its interests without discriminatory DNCR restrictions on commercial telemarketing.
This approach was obvious and squarely before the agencies. In fact, this is precisely what
the FTC and FCC chose to do with regard to charitable telemarketing – i.e., rely on those
other requirements in tandem with refined company-specific rules. The governm ent’s offer
of a smorgasbord of regulations does not empower it to keep items on the menu that are
more restrictive than necessary.
III.

THE NATIONAL DNC REGISTRY FEES VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In order to create and implement the national DNCR, the FTC has imposed a
revenue-based tax on First Amendment activity in violation of the Constitution. The rules
require affected telemarketers to pay a fee for access to the registry as a precondition to
constitutionally-protected speech. See generally FTC Fee Order. By structuring its regulatory
scheme in this way, the government runs headlong into a well-established body of law in
which the Supreme Court has shown its aversion to special taxes or fees on expressive
activities. It is bedrock law that no one may be “compelled to purchase, through a license
fee or a license tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (internal quote omitted).
Although the government may constitutionally impose a fee limited to the “expense
incident to the administration” of a speech regulation, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
577 (1941), the Supreme Court has held that such fees m ust be narrowly tailored to match
actual administrative costs. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113-14. In this regard, the Court has shown
particular antipathy to taxes and fees that discriminate between speakers. Arkansas Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (invalidating exemptions from sales taxes for
religious, professional, trade and sports magazines).
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Here, the government has admitted it will use a substantial portion (and perhaps most)
of the funds generated by fees imposed on protected, truthful speech to pay for general
agency outreach functions and technical systems used to address “fraud-related”
complaints. 52 Congress authorized the FTC to collect $18.1 million to implement the
DNCR, but the FTC is paying an outside contractor only $3.5 million to administer the
registry. Although the FTC is hazy on details, it claims the excess $14.6 million is needed to
cover “agency infrastructure and administration costs, including information technology
structural supports,” and in particular, “the Consumer Sentinel system (the agency’s
repository for all consumer fraud-related complaints) and its attendant infrastructure.” FTC
Fee Order at 45141. Significantly, the FTC reported to Congress recently that the vast
majority of telemarketing complaints do not relate to “do-not-call” issues at all. Only about
one in ten of the complaints filed with the agency about telemarketing concern unwanted
telephone calls. See, e.g., Know Your Caller Act, supra note 2. Accordingly, the DNCR fee
schedule is an unconstitutional revenue measure.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court affirm the
judgments of the district courts below and vacate the FCC’s new TCPA registry rules.
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See FCC Order at 14031 n.101, 14036 n.123 (emphasis added). The fee schedule also
discriminates among speakers without regard to administrative costs. FTC Fee Order at 45139 (distinct
corporate divisions, etc., within company are separate sellers required to pay own fees to access registry,
while unified companies placing same number of calls to same number of consumers pay once).
Compare also 16 C.F.R. § 310.8(e) (exempt entities (e.g., charities, politicians, etc.) may voluntarily access
registry free of charge), with FTC Fee Order at 45135-36 (telemarketers or other service providers may
voluntarily access registry independent of clients on whose behalf they place calls, but must pay to do
so even if the client has already bought the list).
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